Ethics is defined as the realm of the 'ought', the realm of conscience which postulates that Man has the freedom to carry out what he judges to be morally right. By such acts he realizes his freedom of making himself into a truer, more authentic person than he was before. A libertarian psychotherapy, based on this ethic, is outlined. Medical science (as all science) belongs to the realm of the 'is' and postulates that the phenomena which it studies follow a (...) necessary course. It is therefore deterministic. In psychiatry, allowance is made for a neurological determinism in cases in which personal freedom has been diminished or abolished by mental illness, but the determinisms of behaviour therapy and of psycho-analysis are rejected by the author. (shrink)

Problems of the relationship between man and nature are becoming a steadily increasing portion of the questions facing modern civilization. Moreover, their character is changing significantly. Only two or three decades ago, the most acute problems were an unending list of "shortages" of one type or another, while the environment in which men lived was regarded primarily as a set of resources without which things could not be produced. Today it is the threat of excessive human influences on nature that (...) has taken center stage. The biosphere is beginning to be perceived on the level of its capacity to assimilate what has been produced, and the growing question is how best to combine the scientific-technological creations of man with the objective processes occurring in nature. (shrink)

The siren call of individualism is compelling. And although we have recognized its dangerous allure in the realm of adult decision-making, it has had profound and yet unnoticed dangerous effects in pediatric decision-making as well. Liberal individualism as instantiated in the best interest standard conceptualizes the child as independent and unencumbered and the goal of child rearing as rational autonomous adulthood, a characterization that is both ontologically false and normatively dangerous. Although a notion of the individuated child might have a (...) place in establishing a threshold of care obligated and enforced by the state, beyond this context we should turn our attention more explicitly to the relational interests of children. (shrink)

This article examines whether a policy of mandatory neonatal eye prophylaxis is ethically justified within the Canadian context. An existing framework for public health ethics is used to examine criteria that would justify state intervention in parental decision-making authority in order to protect public health. The benefits, harms, and utility of mandatory neonatal eye prophylaxis are described. Established criteria for the infringement of basic individual liberties in the interests of public health, including effectiveness, proportionality, necessity, least infringement and public justification, (...) are considered. The extent and limits of parental decision-making authority are then discussed, and conditions that warrant state intervention in parental decision-making based on the harm principle are reviewed. Ultimately, infringement of parental authority is not deemed to be necessary to protect public health or to protect the newborn in this case and existing circumstances do not meet any criteria that would justify such an infringement. Mandatory eye prophylaxis is found not to be ethically justified in the current Canadian context. (shrink)

Upshot: In view of Kenny’s clinical insights, Hug’s notes on the intricacies of rational vs. a-rational “knowing” in the design sciences, and Chronaki & Kynigos’s notice of mathematics teachers’ meta-communication on experiences of change, this response reframes the heuristic power of bisociation and suspension of disbelief in the light of Kelly’s notion of “as-if-ism” (constructive alternativism. Doing as-if and playing what-if, I reiterate, are critical to mitigating intra-and inter-personal relations, or meta-communicating. Their epistemic status within the radical constructivist framework is (...) cast in the context of mutually enriching conversational techniques, or language-games, inspired by Maturana’s concepts of “objectivity in parenthesis” and the multiverse. (shrink)

The literary contest of the two tragedians in Frogs is introduced by four stanzas redolent of Homeric combat, with their predominantly dactylic metre and a number of high-flown epic words. I am surprised that several editors prefer the reading ὑψὑλøωυ at 818, as íππóλοøος surely has a resonance of íπποκορυστ⋯ς of Iliad 2.1, etc. The readings and sense, however, of both halves of 819 have long been controversial. As Dover suggested in his 1993 edition the MSS ‘linch-pins of splinters’ is (...) less satisfactory than his proposed transposition to ‘splintering of linch-pins', which suggests a recollection of the dangers of chariot accidents or collisions, as in the funeral games of Il. 23. But the following expression ‘shavings of deeds’ is even more puzzling, and highly improbable, and Heiberg's emendation to σμιλο⋯, agreeing with φωτÓς, is preferred by Stanford among others, though doubted by Dover. (shrink)

Aelivs donatvs, the note d grammarian of the fourth century of our era, wrote commentaries on Terence and Virgil. The commentary on Terence has been preserved, though in a curiously heterogeneous form which thus far has defied analysis. The most plausible supposition is that our present text is a conflation of two commentaries, one by Donatus himself, and one by Euanthius, whose work was obviously utilized for part of the introductory note on comedy. But even if this is the right (...) statement of the question, the question remains to be solved. The problem of the commentary on Virgil is, unfortunately, more simple, or at least is universally adjudged more simple. We have extant Donatus's life of Virgil, his dedicatory letter to Lucius Munatius, and his introductory remarks on Bucolic poetry. The commentary itself, save for scattered references in later grammarians, glossaries, and commentaries, has been lost. (shrink)

This second visit to the place of Virgil's birth was made partly in actuality—for my wife and I, before taking part in the Virgilian Cruise of last summer, spent two delightful days at Pietole with our hosts, the Signori Prati, and our guest and friend Bruno Nardi—and partly in a renewed pondering of the arguments presented by my friend Professor Conway both in his earlier article and in his recent review of the question, to which, as he says, I had (...) urged him to return. I promised him at the time that if he should not speak the last word on the subject, I would still further defend the view commonly accepted until he bestowed an extraordinary publicity on Calvisano and Carpenedolo. He declares that I maintain the traditional site at Pietole, ‘though not perhaps with very great confidence.’ He further implies that I ‘do not want to accept the evidence of Probus because “I prefer” to believe a mediaeval tradition.’ Let me assure him and the reader that I do not regard a mediaeval tradition per se as better proof than the certain statement of an ancient authority. I have been led, by studies in various fields, to respect tradition in general until it is disproved, and to lay the burden of the argument on those who would disprove it. But the mere sight of something hoary and mediaeval does not prompt me to exclaim, ‘Media Aetas locuta est; causa finita est’ I relish the attempts of an iconoclast to destroy rigid error, and accept his destruction if it is accomplished. In the present case, however, I have ‘very great confidence’ that Conway's assault on the tradition has come to naught. Possibly some new and unexpected evidence may yet be discovered, showing that Virgil was born at Calvisano, or Carpenedolo, or at some other site than Pietole—but nobody has presented it yet. (shrink)

Bowra, referring to the image of the, and to the striking impression, states ‘Pindar seems to fuse two unusually disparate images into a single result… While the sheddingof leaves implies that he would have grown old without winning any wide renown, the cock means that such renown as he would have got would have beenof little account in the Greek world at large.’ Gildersleeve's comment ad loc, ‘The thus becomes a flower’, implies a similar assumption, that the secondimage is entirely (...) unconnected with the first. (shrink)